How Autocrats Compete - pr_31550

How Autocrats Compete

Parties, Patrons, and Unfair Elections in Africa



Or 4 payments of $58.28 with

delivery message Free delivery for orders over $49.99

Add to Wish List
Delivered in 10 - 14 days
Available for Click and Collect
Most autocrats now hold unfair elections, yet how they compete in them and manipulate them differs greatly. How Autocrats Compete advances a theory that explains variation in electoral authoritarian competition. Using case studies of Tanzania, Cameroon, and Kenya, along with broader comparisons from Africa, it finds that the kind of relationships autocrats foster with supporters and external actors matters greatly during elections. When autocrats can depend on credible ruling parties that provide elites with a level playing field and commit to wider constituencies, they are more certain in their own support and can compete in elections with less manipulation. Shelter from international pressure further helps autocrats deploy a wider range of coercive tools when necessary. Combining in-depth field research, within-case statistics, and cross-regional comparisons, Morse fills a gap in the literature by focusing on important variation in authoritarian institution building and international patronage. Understanding how autocrats compete sheds light on the comparative resilience and durability of modern authoritarianism.

Product code: 9781108474764

ISBN 9781108474764
Publisher Cambridge University Press
No. of pages 352
Dimensions H234xW155xS24
This book is for students, researchers, and policymakers interested in unfair elections and African politics. It argues that how autocrats compete depends on the kind of relationships they foster with supporters and external actors. How Autocrats Compete helps us understand the current state of democracy, and how modern authoritarianism operates.