The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy - pr_275035

The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy

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The key question for understanding courts is why political actors would ever create or allow for the continued existence of independent courts with the ability to check their power. This book argues that fear of what happens after losing office induces leaders to countenance independent courts: more competitive elections means more independent courts. Because losing office is more dangerous in non-democratic regimes, in those

Product code: 9780198845027

ISBN 9780198845027
Dimensions (HxWxD in mm) H240xW160xS18
No. Of Pages 224
Publisher Oxford University Press
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.